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VIENNA CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR 1,YRES S. McDouGAL, UNITED STATES DELEGA-
TION, TO COMMITTEE OF THE WaHOLE, APRIL 19, 1968:
MR. CAIRMiAN AND DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUES:
In the note verbale of October 2, 1967, from its Permanent Representative
to the United Nations, the United States Government indicated that it
considered Articles 27 and 28 ' on the interpretation of treaties to lay
down "overly rigid and unnecessarily restricted requirements."
It is the purpose of the amendment submitted by the United States Dele-
gation in Document L. 156 2 to suggest a simple and easy way of eliminat-
ing these difficulties in Articles 27 and 28 and of re-establishing the au-
thority and viability of a process of interpretation which has served the
peoples of the world well for several centuries.
The rigidities and restrictions of Articles 27 and 28 are by now the
common knowledge of us all. In its separation of Articles 27 and 28 the
draft Convention establishes a hierarchical distinction between certain
primary means of interpretation, described as a "general rule of inter-
pretation," and certain allegedly "supplementary means of interpreta-
tion." Among the primary means a predominant emphasis is ascribed
to the text of the treaty, which is to be interpreted "in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms." The Commentary to
Article 27 insists that the reference in the Article to "context" is not to
factual circumstances attending the conclusion of the treaty, but to the
mere verbal texts, and, similarly, that the reference to "object and pur-
pose" is not to the actual common intent of the parties, explicitly rejected
I For Arts. 27 and 28, see 61 A.J.I.L. 348 (1967) [Ed.].
2 The U. S. proposal of April 10, 1968 (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.156) reads:
Amend article 27 to read as follows:
"A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in order to determine the meaning to
be given to its terms in the light of all relevant factors, including in particular:
(a) the context of the treaty;
(b) its objects and purposes;
(c) any agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty;
(d) any instrument made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty;
(e) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
common understanding of the meaning of the terms as between the parties generally;
(f) the preparatory work of the treaty;
(g) the circumstances of its conclusion;
(h) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties;
(i) the special meaning to be given to a term if the parties intended such term to
have a special meaning."
Delete article 28. [Ed.]
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as the goal of interpretation, but rather to mere words about "object and
purpose" intrinsic to the text. Indeed, it is overwhelmingly evident (as
noted by Messrs. Ago, Ruda, Rosenne, and others in the Commission) that
the whole structure of Articles 27 and 28 is built about the famous petitio
principii of Vattel that "it is not permissible to interpret what has no need
of interpretation." The "supplementary means" which an interpreter is
authorized to employ only after taking certain high, preclusionary hurdles
-include "the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of
its conclusion." The high preclusionary hurdles--designed to foreclose
automatic, habitual recourse to such "supplementary means"--are a
necessity "to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article
27" or a finding that an "interpretation according to Article 27" either
"leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure" or "leads to a result which
is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." In its Commentary to Article 28,
the Commission insists, despite its earlier protestations that it did not
seek to establish an obligatory hierarchy, that the word "supplementary"
"emphasizes that Article 28 does not provide for alternative, autonomous,
means of interpretation but only for means to aid an interpretation gov-
erned by the principles contained in Article 27."
It is the respectful submission of the United States Delegation that
these rigidities and restrictions in Articles 27 and 28 have never in the
past been international law, cannot successfully be made international
law in the future even if adopted in this Convention, and should not be
made international law in the future even if we possessed the omnipotence
so to make them.
*Why do we say that these rigidities and restrictions have never been
international law? The answer is written large in the history of inter-
pretation in particular cases of controversy.
First, the principles of interpretation, taken as a whole, have seldom in
the past been considered as mandatory rules of law, precluding examination
of relevant circumstances; they have most often been considered permissive
guidelines, facilitating examination of relevant circumstances. Only very
rarely, in the countless instances of interpretation, which create people's
realistic expectations about what the relevant law is, have even the prin-
ciples about plain and natural meaning and about the admissibility of
preparatory work been employed in a way to foreclose inquiry.
Secondly, though judges and statesmen have sometimes purported to
resolve disputes about interpretation by the application of simple dic-
tionary definitions of the words of a text, they have much more frequently
affirmed that a text is meaningless apart from the larger context of circum-
stances in which it was framed. The long historic trend in the great bulk
of decisions is for an interpreter to take into account any circumstance
which may effect the common intention which parties seek to express in a
text. Thus, the Harvard Research, after an exhaustive study of the cases,
summarized in a passage fully confirmed by subsequent decisions:
"The historical background of a treaty, travazux pr~paratoires, the
circumstances of the parties at the time the treaty was entered into,
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the change in these circumstances sought to be effected, the subsequent
conduct of the parties in applying the provisions of the treaty, and
the conditions prevailing at the time interpretation is being made, are
to be considered in connection with the general purpose which the
treaty is intended to serve."
In the vast majority of cases, "plain" and "ordinary," or dictionary,
meanings have been regarded not as inexorable commands foreclosing fur-
ther inquiry, but rather as one important index, among many other im-
portant indices, of the common intent of the parties. Interpreters have
habitually employed many principles of interpretation, such for example
as the principle of effectiveness which is not incorporated in the draft Con-
vention, in canvass of all potentially relevant indices.
Thirdly, in more recent years the hoary maxim from Vattel, about which
the hierarchy in Articles 27 and 28 is structured, has become generally
recognized as an obscurantist tautology. It is a tautology because the de-
termination of what text does or does not require interpretation is in
itself an interpretation; it is obscurantist because the grounds for such
determination are not revealed for candid appraisal. Lord *ATcNair puts
the matter in a nutshell in noting that the maxim "is constantly employed
both by advocates and tribunals, as an argument against seeking to find
out what was the intent of the parties in using the words, having regard
to the surrounding circumstances." He adds: "It is in truth a petitio
principii because it begs the question whether the words used are, or are
not clear-a subjective matter because they may be clear to one man and
not clear to another, and frequently to one or more judges and not to their
colleagues." (Law of Treaties (1961) 372.)
Finally, the restrictions upon the use of preparatory works expressed in
Article 28 do not, any more than the restrictions imposed upon the use of
other circumstances, represent established practice. The Commentary quite
correctly describes these restrictions as "dicta." Even in the Lotus case,
which perhaps contains the most famous exposition of the alleged rule
that "there is no occasion to have regard to preparatory work if the text
of a convention is sufficiently clear in itself," the Court did in fact look at
the travaux. This would appear to have been equally the case in most
other instances in which a similar rule has been announced, and in many
recent decisions judges have not bothered to apologize for resort to the
travaiix. The habitual use of preparatory work by foreign offices needs
no emphasis here. It may be recalled also that one of the reasons given
by Dr. Jenks for the immunization of international organizations from the
Convention was that "IL0 practice has involved greater recourse to pre-
paratory work than was envisaged in Article 28."
In sum, it would thus appear entirely clear that none of the rigidities
and restrictions built into Articles 27 and 28 can find justifieation in the
wisdom of past experience.
Why do we say that the rigidities and restrictions of Articles 27 and 28
cannot successfully be made international law even if adopted in this
Conventioni? The answer is: because they are impossible of application.
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The assumption upon which such rigidities and restrictions are built is
that a text has a meaning apart from the circumstances of its framing and
can be interpreted barely, as it stands, without reference to extraneous
factors.
The fact is that a text is, apart from the intentions of its users, as a
great English philosopher has said, "but shapes on paper or aR agitation
in the air." It is generally agreed, in today's age of sophistication, that
there are no fixed or natural meanings of words which the parties to an
agreement cannot alter. The point was put epigrammatically by our
Mr. Justice Holmes, who wrote: "A word is not a crystal, transparent
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly
in color and content according to the circumstances and time in which it
is used."
Similarly, even without. benefit of modern communications study, com-
mon sense informs us that the "plain and ordinary" meanings-the dic-
tionary meanings--of words are multiple and ambiguous, and can be
made particular and clear only by reference to the factual circumstance
of their use. With characteristic felicity, Lord McNair has described the
appropriate function of the "plain and ordinary" meaning rule. This
"so-called rule of interpretation," he writes, "like others is merely a
starting point, a prima facie guide, and cannot be allowed to obstruct the
essential quest in the application of treaties, namely, the search for the
real intention of the contracting parties in using the language employed
by them." (Law of Treaties (1961) 366.)
The difficulties in the draft Convention's more preclusionary use of
"ordinary" meaning was noted by many members of the International
Law Commission. Thus Professor Briggs, speaking as a member of the
Commission, urged deletion of the concept of "ordinary meaning," a term
"which he found just as objectionable as the former reference to the
'natural' meaning." "Words," he insisted, "have no ordinary or natural
meanings in isolation from their context and the other elements of inter-
pretation."
From this broad perspective of the requirements of communication and
the necessities of interpretation, it would, therefore, appear that an in-
terpreter could not hope to apply the draft Convention's "general rule"
in Article 27 or to invoke the "supplementary means" authorized in Article
28 without at the same time violating the alleged prescription of textuality
in Article 27. The "general rule" cannot be applied because a concern
for the text alone, apart from the circumstances of its conclusion, can
afford no criteria for ascribing a meaning to the text. Similarly, without
having recourse to "the preparatory work of the treaty and the circum-
stances of its conclusion," it would appear impossible, as Mr. Rosenne and
other members of the Commission suggested, to determine whether an "in-
terpretation according to Article 27" either "leaves the meaning ambiguous
or obscure" or "leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreason-
able." The point was made, with a cogency as direct as unheeded, by Mr.
Yasseen, who said "that the clearness or ambiguity of a provision was a
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relative matter." "Sometimes," he explained, "one had to refer to the
preparatory work or look at the circumstances surrounding the conclusion
of the treaty in order to determine whether the text was really clear and
whether the seeming clarity was not simply a deceptive appearance. He
could not accept an Article which would permit reference to preparatory
work only after it had been decided that the text was not clear, that de-
cision itself being often influenced by the same sources." (1964 Yearbook
313.) The Commentary adds, in a triumph of understatement: "Sir
Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, noted that it was sometimes im-
possible to understand clearly even the object and purpose of the treaty
without such reference" (Id.).
The ultimate poverty of the textuality approach is, for final illustration,
most dramatically documented by the problem of conflicting authenticated
texts in several languages, a problem dealt with in Article 29, with respect
to which the Commission is forced to resort, albeit somewhat shamefacedly,
to the "intentions" of the parties.
In parenthesis, it could be added that the mere presence at this Confer-
ence of Sir Humphrey Waldock, in the r6le of former Special Bapporteur,
is the best testimony, not always mute, of the impossibility in application
of the textuality approach. Time after time during the course of our
deliberations, even with the preparatory work of the Commission before us,
we have found it necessary to appeal to Sir Humphrey for enlightenment
about the "ordinary" meanings of the simple Convention before us. The
tremendous clarity he has brought to our deliberations and the enormous
influence he has had with us have been due, I submit, not to his skill in
flipping the pages of a dictionary or as a logician, but rather to his very
special knowledge of all the circumstances attending the framing of our
draft Convention.
Why do we urge-to come to our third major point-that the rigidities
and restrictions in Articles 27 and 28 should not be made international
law-even if in defiance of the requirements of communication and the
necessities of interpretation we could so make them? The answer again
can be summarized: because of their authorizing of two different kinds of
arbitrariness, such rigidities and restrictions could be employed by inter-
preters to impose upon the parties to treaties agreements they never made
and, hence, might be most disruptive of that stability in the expectations
of parties to treaties which is indispensable to peaceful co-operation in the
world's work.
The first kind of arbitrariness authorized by Articles 27 and 28 derives
from their arrogating to a single set of signs-the text of a document as
infused by "ordinary" meaning-the task of serving, save in the most
exceptional circumstances, as the exclusive index of the common intent of
the parties. The fact is of course that the parties to any particular treaty
may have a common intent quite different from that expressed by ordinary
meanings and may communicate to each other by many different signs and
acts of collaboration. To impose upon such parties certain alleged "ordi-
nary" meanings and an artificial, preclusionary hierarchy in the relevance
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of modes of communication may amount to clumsy and arbitrary deforma-
tion, completely contrary to the basic policies of a free world order. Just
as in our national communities we seek, save for overriding common inter-
est, to defend the dignity of man by respecting his choices rather than by
imposing the choices of others upon him, so also in the larger community
of states a law of freedom will seek to respect the unique choices of the
particular parties to agreements rather than to impose upon them the
choices of others. "It should be," as we have said elsewhere, "the task
of decision-makers, representing a larger community dedicated to the
shaping and sharing of values by persuasion and agreement with a mini-
mum of coercion and violence, to honor and promote individuality, inven-
tiveness and diversity, and to expand the alternatives in co-operation open
to as many members of the community as possible on as many occasions
as possible. It can only be a debasement of the basic values of such a com-
munity to seek to impose upon all parties, whatever their nuances in crea-
tivity, the lowest common denominator in conformity." In modest con-
cession to parties of unstandardized demands and expectations, Article
27 (4) does provide that "a special meaning shall be given to a term if it
is established that the parties so intended." The Commentary emphasizes,
however, that "the burden of proof lies on the party invoking the special
term," and it is nowhere indicating how, without recourse to the forbidden
factors in Article 28, such a burden is to be discharged and a special mean-
ing established.
The second kind of arbitrariness authorized by Articles 27 and 28 derives
from the inherent ambiguities, already noted, of the criterion of ordinary
meaning. What is one man's "ordinary meaning" may be another man's
poison, and reasonable men may reasonably differ as to which of multiple
dictionary meanings represents common intent. The license which these
inescapable ambiguities accord an interpreter-whose task is conceived
as the mere ascription of a meaning to a text rather than as a systematic
and disciplined examination of all potentially relevant indices of common
intent-is enormous. Emphasis upon the primacy of the text and the
priority of ordinary meanings certainly opens more doors to uncertainty
-even to obscurantist manipulation-than does insistence upon a compre-
hensive, contextual examination of all factors potentially relevant to com-
mon intent.
The danger of encouraging arbitrariness in decision by overemphasis
upon the primacy of textuality in interpretation is perhaps best illustrated
by the opinion of the International Court of Justice in the most recent of
the South-West Africa cases. (1966) I.C.J. Rep. 4.
The proponents of the rigidities and restrictions in the present draft
Convention might well ask themselves whether this is the kind of decision
and opinion which they wish to authorize and promote. The requirement,
in contrast, of a systematic and disciplined examination of all potentially
relevant features of the context would certainly make it more difficult
for judges to justify arbitrary interpretations; it might even make it more
difficult for them to make such decisions.
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In not irrelevant footnote it can be added that the hierarchy among
criteria for interpretation established by Articles 27 and 28, and made ap-
plicable through the vague references to "ambiguous or obscure" mean-
ings and to results "manifestly absurd or unreasonable," could introduce
an entirely new element of uncertainty into the stability of treaties. States
prejudiced by either the invocation or the non-application of the hierarchy
could have a new ground for claims of excas do pouvoir. It must be re-
called that it is proposed to make this vague and illusory hierarchy obliga-
tory international law. The misapplication of relevant law, which could
easily occur or be alleged with respect to terms so diffuse, is one of the
traditional grounds for confirming excs de pouvoir.
The fundamental point that the United States Delegation would empha-
size is that the text of a treaty and the common or public meanings of
words can be made economic points of departure for interpretation, as the
International Law Commission aspires, without their being made also the
end of the voyage of inquiry. The dichotomy the Commission makes when
it contraposes "the intention of the parties as a subjective element distinct
from the text" and "the text of the treaty as the authentic expression of
the intention of the parties" is a non-exhaustive dichotomy. The most
important alternative omitted is that the text could be regarded as simply
one important index, among many, of the common intent of the parties
and not as a preclusionary bar to examination of the other indices neces-
sary to the realistic and rational relation of text and common intent. The
Convention on Treaties could establish appropriate principles of economic
procedure, without imposing an incubus of arbitrary hierarchical weight-
ings.
In its Amendment, L. 156, the United States Delegation, therefore, pro-
poses, as was urged by Professor Briggs and others within the Commission,
the elimination of all the rigidities and restrictions in Articles 27 and
28 and the merger of these two articles into one open-ended itemization
of elements relevant to rational interpretation. Though in the opening
words of our amendment we place an economic emphasis upon the terms
of the text, we seek to avoid any fixed hierarchy among the elements of
interpretation and to make accessible to interpreters whatever elements-
be they "ordinary meaning" or "subsequent practice" or "preparatory
work" or other-which may be of significance in any particular set of
circumstances. The aspiration of our draft is to encourage an economic,
systematic, and disciplined canvass by interpreters of all elements which
may aid in the identification and clarification of common intent.
In the formulation of its Amendment, the United States Delegation has
sought to preserve as fully as possible the original wording of the Inter-
national Law Commission, while securing the merger of Articles 27 and
28. Our Delegation is not, however, wedded to any particular words or
formulations. If the basic objective of removing all hierarchical weight-
ings and obstacles to open-ended inquiry can be achieved, our Delegation
will regard the particular formula by which this can be secured as a mere
matter of drafting.
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